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Abstract: In terms of service provision, the electricity sector is the most important critical infrastruc-
ture sector, on the supply of which the vast majority of society and its basic vital functions depend.
Extensive disruption of these supplies would have negative effects not only on basic human needs,
but also on the economy and security of the state. For this reason, it is necessary to ensure permanent
and comprehensive monitoring of the infrastructure elements resilience level, especially against
threats with a multispectral impact on several areas of security. For this reason, the authors of the
article developed the Converged Resilience Assessment (CRA) method, which enables advanced
assessment of the electricity critical infrastructure elements resilience from the converged security
point of view. Converged security in this case combines (converges) physical, cyber and operational
security into a complementary unit. This reflects the integral determinants of resilience across related
areas of security/safety. The CRA method focuses mainly on information and situation management,
which integrates and correlates information (signals) from systems and sensors in order to obtain an
overview of the situation and the subsequent effective management of its solution. The practical use
of the proposed method is demonstrated on a selected element of the Czech Republic transmission
system. The CRA method is currently embodied in a functional sample that has been piloted on
several TSO elements. Further development of this method is seen mainly in fulfilling the logic of
network infrastructure and reflection between elementary and intersectoral links in the context of
synergistic and cascading effects in a broader context.
Keywords: critical infrastructure; electricity; resilience assessment; converged security; penalty factors
1. Introduction
Critical infrastructure is a comprehensive system, the essence of which is the perma-
nent provision of services, necessary for the functioning of society [1]. The sectors that
determine this system are classified into technical and socio-economic ones on the basis of
functional specifics [2]. The most important technical sector of the critical infrastructure
system, which is called uniquely critical on the basis of Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-
21 [3], is energy. This unique criticality is especially evident in the electricity subsector, on
the supply of which all other critical infrastructure sectors are depend [4]. The importance
of the energy sector is also evident in critical infrastructure systems on other continents,
such as Europe [5], Asia [6] or Australia [7].
The electricity sector is constantly exposed to the negative impact of security threats
during the production, transmission and distribution of electricity [8–10]. For this reason,
it is essential that its elements achieve a high level of resilience, which is defined in the
critical infrastructure system as “the ability to reduce the magnitude and/or duration
of disruptive events; the effectiveness of a resilient infrastructure or enterprise depends
upon its ability to anticipate, absorb, adapt to, and/or rapidly recover from a potentially
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disruptive event” [11]. For this reason, it is necessary to constantly improve not only the
tools for strengthening the resilience [12], but also the approaches to its assessment.
Current approaches to assessing resilience are based on the so-called single-issue ap-
proach. These include e.g., Assessing and Strengthening Organisational Resilience–ASOR
Method [13], Critical Infrastructure Elements Resilience Assessment–CIERA Method [14],
Availability-based engineering resilience metric and its corresponding evaluation method-
ology [15], Resilience Capacities Assessment for Critical Infrastructures Disruption: The
READ Framework [16], A Quantitative Method for Assessing Resilience of Interdependent
Infrastructures [17] and Guidelines for Critical Infrastructure Resilience Evaluation [18].
The disadvantage of the single-issue approach is that it allows only a separate re-
silience assessment in individual security areas, e.g., cyber security, physical security,
process security, environmental security, organizational security. This does not consider the
integral determinants of resilience across related areas. For this reason, the authors of the
article created the method of Converged Resilience Assessment (CRA), which allows the
electricity critical infrastructure resilience assessment from the perspective of converged
security. Converged security in this case combines physical, cyber and operational security
into one unit.
2. Current Approaches to Energy Critical Infrastructure Security Assessment
Within the analysis of the historical context, it can be concluded that the individual
types of energy infrastructure elements security were considered as separate areas that
solve only limited security problems. The most common was usually physical security [19],
which extended to other infrastructure entities, possibly as needed, to other types of spe-
cific security important to them, such as personnel, administrative and others [20]. Later,
with the development of database systems, information security began to be monitored
and enforced, which was standardized by the group of international standards ISO/IEC
27000 [21] and relevant national certificates. With the development of packet communi-
cation, IP networks and the increasing incidence of various types of cyber-attacks, the
importance of cyber security has begun to be emphasized [22]. In connection with packet
network technologies such as the Internet, the concept of IT security began to appear, which
referred to the association of cyber and information security into one functional unit [14,23].
At present, there is already a trend to address the security of the organization as a set of
optimized solutions for all essential security types suitable for a given object and combine
them into a single resulting security [24,25].
It can be stated, that recent approaches, mainly used to assess security in energy critical
infrastructure, are focused on (1) risk assessment, (2) security system functions assessment,
and (3) resilience indicators assessment. In the area of risk assessment, attention is paid to
security assessment in the context of system vulnerabilities as a component of risk [26,27].
However, this approach does not create a logical assumption of the interconnection of
individual security components, even with regard to a comprehensive assessment of the
functionality and quality of the security system. Approaches focused on security system
function assessment, presented e.g., in Garcia [28], Sridhar et al. [29] or Zhang et al. [30],
assess the functionality of individual security aspects out of the interconnectedness and
dependence of the integrated security system scope, which can be considered as grey spots
of increasing security process, and thus the of critical infrastructure resilience. The third
mentioned group of approaches focused on resilience indicators assessment, perceives
security as an incomplete set of measures, logically unconnected components of security,
divided into individual capacities or indicators of resilience [31] or from the perspective of
a performance-oriented understanding of resilience [32].
It can be therefore stated, that it is recently possible to assess the energy critical
infrastructure level security in in different ways. Risk assessment approaches emphasize
the position of risk in the transferred meaning of critical infrastructure vulnerability, and to
some extent reduce the importance and position of a comprehensive concept of individual
security aspects interconnection and complementarity. In this context, in many cases
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only one aspect/component of security is used, which addresses only selected aspects of
vulnerability for a specific limited and specific risk environment. Approaches assessing the
selected group of security components functionality or functional parameters, delimit and
to some extent isolate this group, without interconnection to other groups, or, conversely,
there is a duplication and uncertainty level increasing in the functionality assessment
process. Therefore, it can be argued that the link between cyber security and the detection
function of the physical protection system is often not obvious. Approaches assessing
capacity, performance or resilience indicators as an extension of critical infrastructure
protection approaches in many cases include the same or similar aspects or components of
security in individual resilience attributes, which is creating duplication and ambiguity of
complementarity and interconnectedness.
Due to the presented shortcomings of the mentioned approaches, the authors intended
to develop an approach enabling factual, logical and functional interconnection, i.e., con-
vergence of the most important aspects and components of security, considering the critical
infrastructure energy sector specifics. The following text therefore presents the frame-
work and the methodology of converged security assessment combining physical, cyber
and operational security, in the context of the electricity critical infrastructure resilience
assessment process.
3. Converged Security: Principles and Solutions
Security is one of the basic attributes of modern society. The aim of security as a
field is to protect reference objects (e.g., people, organizations, critical infrastructure) and
especially their assets from damage, or to minimize the impacts caused by security breaches.
The reference object actively ensures its security through security types [33]. The security
type is a set of measures designed to ensure security in a defined part of the security
environment [34]. It is a systematic and repeated solution of undesirable phenomena of
certain security type breaches. In particular, due to technological development, the number
of security types that the reference object must provide as part of its protection is increasing.
For a manufacturing plant reference object, these security types include physical security,
cyber security, administrative security, and occupational health and safety. If required or it
is necessary, operational security, personnel security, environmental safety, radiation safety,
safety of technical equipment, etc. can be added to them [35].
At present, the various individual security types operate independently of other
security types. This way of ensuring security has a number of negatives. One of the basic
disadvantages of this situation is the inability to link the unmasking symptoms of the
emerging security breach, detected by sensors in individual security types of, into one unit.
For example, if a company employee wants to illegally copy data from the server directly
in the server room, there is currently no cyber security option to detect it by connecting
data from the server room access system with data on copying data directly from the
server’s USB port. Another negative of the above-mentioned conditions is the increasing
costs of ensuring security, resulting from the independent provision of security individual
types. This is reflected both in the technological side and especially in the personnel or
organisational side. Each security type is usually provided by a separate group of experts,
has its own security technologies and protection processes, its own financial budget [36].
At present, for practical reasons, it is necessary to look for ways to combine individual
security types into one unit. This trend has resulted in the concept of converged security,
which is a specific type of security created by merging multiple compatible types of security
into one whole [37]. This security type makes it possible, thanks to the analysis of the
correlation of the earlier (even at the stage of symptoms) security breaches manifestations,
to detect emerging security breaches faster and better and to ensure their solution in a
more targeted manner. Converged security usually includes physical security and cyber
security [38]. However, the structure of the merged security types may be different. The
trend of converged security is a formal cooperation between previously different security
functions. In the context of the new technological concepts development, such as IoT,
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Industry 4.0, Smart Cities, there is a huge increase in data flow, which can be assessed only
on the basis of the bulk data processing algorithms.
This compatibility is based primarily on the need to protect the reference object same
assets. Another condition for compatibility is the temporal characteristics of the security
breach manifestations, which should be approximately the same. In the above example of
converged security, the manifestations will be in the seconds–minutes–hours’ time range.
If the security types were merged, with one changing in minutes and the other in years,
then merging into converged security would be meaningless, because the dominant role
would be played by the security type with short time changes time. The basic principles on
which converged security is based are presented in Figure 1.
Figure 1. Basic Principles of Converged Security.
It follows from the abovementioned principles that converged security is ensured at a
common reference object. This reference object has one or more assets and all the security
types are involved to contribute to ensuring their security. Converged security combines
these security types into one unit [39]. This makes it possible to assess the state of the
security situation as a single image, in which all partial security situations of individual
security types are projected. The added value of merging previously independent secu-
rity types is the possibility of perceiving the correlation of individual security breaches
manifestations into one unit, faster detection of security breaches, its manner, extent and
prediction of a scenario possible future course. Other significant benefits of converged
security include a comprehensive and up-to-date security situation assessment. This as-
sessment makes it possible to adequately address the security situation and thus minimize
the negative effects of security breaches. From the reference object point of view, the state
of the security situation is most often assessed using the resilience level of its protection
system (security system), or the resilience of the reference object as such. For converged
security, the resilience of the protection system is assessed [40]. The fulfilment status of the
reference object target function is not assessed, but the reference object assets protection
state through reference object the protection system. The protection system consists of
measures taken in individual security types.
4. Basis for Resilience Assessing from the Converged Security Perspective
Resilience is one of the basic parameters that are monitored within individual se-
curity types [24]. In this context, resilience is perceived as a property of the reference
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object protection system, which expresses how the given unit is prepared to protect and
defend the reference object and its assets, or to manage the harmful effect of individual
threats [41]. Ongoing and up-to-date knowledge of the protection system resilience level
enables individual security breaches to be addressed and effective remedial action to be
taken. If the individual protection system parameters deteriorate due to deficiencies in
the organization and security, due to technical failures or due to climatic conditions, its
resilience also decreases [42]. Failure to address the decline in resilience level may, in
the event of a security breach, lead to an easier overcoming of the protection system and
damage to reference object assets. Real-time resilience assessments should identify such
situations and allow adequate measures to be taken to protect assets, restore resilience and
remedy the situation [43].
The reference object protection system resilience from the converged security point
of view represents the ability of measures (implemented in individual security types
included in converged security) to protect its assets and thus ensure the fulfilment of the
reference object target function. The resilience assessment should reflect its current level as
a reference object attribute. This attribute can be monitored by sensing manifestations or
changes in external and internal factors [44].
In general, any change in resilience can be qualitatively or quantitatively reflected,
and therefore the effects and impacts on the reference object resilience can be assessed.
Thus, the resilience assessment can be based primarily on sensing those changes in the
state of factors that are substantially reflected in the resilience changes [45]. In this case,
the degree of these factors influence on the element resilience can be expressed in the form
of a penalty. The penalty assesses how much the level of protection system resilience has
decreased during the change of condition. In relation to certain assets, all key factors that
describe changes in the protection system resilience are referred as penalty factors.
Based on the above, it can be confirmed that the specific level of protection system
resilience is a function of all significant changes and manifestations, the consequences of
which apply at the time and have a significant impact on the reference object in terms of
damage to its assets. In this context, the authors of the article defined the framework for
converged resilience assessment (see Figure 2), which is the starting point for resilience
assessment from the converged security perspective.
Figure 2. Converged Resilience Assessment Framework.
The essence of the Converged Resilience Assessment (CRA) framework is to define
the four areas necessary to ensure support for the assessment process. These areas provide
not only the information needed for the assessment (i.e., the technical parameters of the
electricity critical infrastructure element and the penalty factors), but also the information
defining the environment in which the assessment will take place. The definition of this
environment is realized by selecting specific security types for the converged resilience
assessment and defining a specific risks effects scenario on the assessed element. Based
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on this information, it is possible to start the assessment process, the course of which is
described in the following part of the article.
5. Converged Resilience Assessment in Electricity Critical Infrastructure
Based on current requirements and the need to reflect on the current security chal-
lenges of the electricity critical infrastructure sector, also due to its importance, the authors
developed the Converged Resilience Assessment (CRA) method, which allows resilience
assessment in critical infrastructure from a converged security perspective. Converged
security in this case combines (converges) physical, cyber and operational security into
one unit. It focuses mainly on information and situation management, which integrates
and correlates information from systems and sensors in order to obtain an overview of
the situation and the subsequent effective management of its solution. The resilience
assessment can be performed for electricity critical infrastructure element individual assets
as a whole. In case when is necessary to divide the element object into parts, it is possible
to assess the resilience by individual parts and to obtain the resulting element resilience
level by aggregating individual partial resiliencies.
5.1. Reference Object Resilience Assessment
The essence of the CRA method is to determine the electricity critical infrastructure
elements protection system resilience from the converged security point of view, using the
resilience index of reference object R. This index expresses the extent to which the reference
object assets are protected against related risks, potentially minimized by specific security
types included in converged security. The resilience index in this case is a dimensionless
number, the value of which ranges from 0 to 100. The value 100 expresses the maximum
resilience, the value 0 the minimum resilience.
As converged security contains more than one security type and the reference object
usually includes more than one asset, the resilience indices of the individual assets must
first be determined for each security type. From these values, the reference object resulting
resilience index for a given security type, i.e., physical, cybernetic and operational, is then
determined by aggregation. This resulting reference object resilience index is calculated by
the arithmetic mean of the individual security types resilience indices. The relationship




























where R = resilience index of the reference object; Si = resilience index of the i-th security
type; n = number of converged security types; Ipj = physical security resilience index of
the j-th asset; Icj = cyber security resilience index of the j-th asset; Ioj = operational security
resilience index of the j-th asset; m = number of assets assessed.
Aggregation through assets is also possible. This means that the resulting resilience
indices for a given security type by aggregation determine the resulting resilience index for
that asset. The total converged resilience index of the reference object R is then obtained
by aggregating the resilience indices of all the assets that are part of the reference object.
However, for this aggregation it is necessary to use the weighted arithmetic mean of the
converged resilience of individual assets. The mathematical notation of this method of






where R = resilience index of the reference object; Ij = converged resilience index of the j-th
asset; vj = j-th normalized weight of the j-th asset; m = number of assets assessed.
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The resilience of the reference object R is determined as an abstract value, the magnitude
of which ranges from 100 to 0 points. The default resilience value is set to 100. This resilience
value is achieved by a protection system that has all the required measures implemented and
at the same time no penalty has been activated. In practice, such a state is difficult to achieve.
The assessment itself is determined by decrementing this final value (100) according to the
detected problems/incidents. The value 100 can therefore be imagined as a state of “required
(absolute) resilience of the object”. And the problems just detected are understood as penalty
factors that reduce this value. The lower resilience limit of the reference object is limited to 0.
Achieving zero resilience represents a state where no protection system measure is working
or a state where all penalty factors are activated. In practice, however, even if the protection
system is overcome, such a situation usually does not occur. It follows that the resilience of
the protection system usually does not decrease to 0.
5.2. Calculation of Converged Asset Resilience
Converged resilience index of the asset I j is the aggregation of asset resilience indices
for individual security types, i.e., Ip, Ic, Io. The value of the index also ranges from 0 to
100. The calculation of the resilience index is performed using penalty factors so that the
reduction in resilience caused by penalty factors is subtracted from the default value of 100.
Penalty factors are divided into static and dynamic. These factors depend on the two parts
of the protection system, the static part and the dynamic part. The static part reflects the
penalty obtained for the measures that the protection system should have and does not
have at the given time. This is usually based on a standard that defines the structure and
measures of the protection system in a given security type. Alternatively, an overview of
recommended measures in the form of “best practices” can be used (the definition of penalty
factors is given in Section 5.3). Key measures include security policy, physical security,
mechanical barrier systems, alarm systems, anti-virus protection, etc. The dynamic part of
the equation then reflects the penalty obtained by the intruder, failures, non-compliance
with regime measures and dynamically corrects the value of static penalties.
Calculation of the converged resilience index of the asset I according to the Equation (3)
is based on arithmetic aggregation of asset resilience indices for individual security types:
I =
Ip + Ic + Io
3
(3)
where I = index of asset converged resilience; Ip = asset physical security resilience index;
Ic = asset cyber security resilience index; Io = asset operational security resilience index.
The essence of the calculation of the asset resilience index for individual security types
Ip, Ic, Io is presented in Figure 3.
Figure 3. The essence of the calculation of the asset resilience index for individual security types.
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Based on Figure 3, it is possible to determine Equation (4) for calculating the asset










where Ip,c,o = asset resilience index of a given security type (i.e., physical, cyber or opera-
tional); Isp = asset static penalty index; Idp = asset dynamic penalty index.





where Isp = asset static penalty index; Psa = active static penalty factor in a given security
type; Ps = static penalty factor in a given security type.





where Idp = asset dynamic penalty index; Pda = active dynamic penalty factor in a given
security type; Pd = dynamic penalty factor in a given security type.
The following text presents an example of calculating the asset static penalty index
of the type of physical security (see Table 1). At this stage of the resilience assessment, a
convergent approach is already evident, the essence of which is to consider the effects of
the physical security penalty (see column PS) in all three security types. A similar approach
would also assess the area of cyber security (in the CS column) and the area of operational
security (in the OS column).
Table 1. Example of calculating the asset physical security static penalty index.
Static Penalty Factors




The entrance to the inner protected area can be monitored 80 No
Regular functional tests are performed 40 No
Regular inspections of electrical equipment are carried out 20 No
The procedure for dealing with emergencies (security
incidents, terrorist threats) is set out 50 Yes
The determination of responsibilities, duties and powers is
implemented 20 No
Cyber security area
Rules for creating passwords 30 No
Incident reporting procedures 45 No
Incident detection processes 50 No
Incident severity assessment 40 No
Incident resolution processes 30 Yes
Operational
security area
Backup power 20 No
Radio communication 40 No
Communication over the organization’s telephone network 25 No
Communication via public telephone network 10 Yes
Employee computers/laptops 40 No
∑ Psa 90
∑ Ps 540
Legend: PS–physical security, CS–cyber security, OS–operational security.
The bold marked active physical security static penalty factors express in a figurative
sense the non-fulfilment of the formulated factors found during the selected asset security
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assessment, which leads to their activation. In the case of dynamic penalty factors, the
procedure is analogous.
5.3. Defining Penalty Factors
Penalty data (penalty) is a number generated statically or dynamically on the basis of
a certain finding or change of the observed factor (agent), having or reflecting a significant
effect on resilience. The amount of the penalty is directly proportional to the degree of
change effect or finding on resilience.
As part of the resilience assessment process, detected problems (e.g., absence of security
documentation, failures of alarm devices, intrusion detection, etc.) are considered as penalty
factors that reduce this value. Penalty factors can be classified into static and dynamic.
Static factors are those effects that affect the protection system until they are eliminated,
but it is a long-term effect. They do not repair/appear themselves. In this section, there
are problems/incidents, which are mostly based on the absence of processes necessary to
manage security, the absence of physical security elements, non-compliance with applicable
legislation, missed inspections, revisions, etc.
Dynamic factors are factors that change over time as a result of changes in the security
situation, and their duration is not accurately predictable. These include, for example,
motion detection using a camera system, security breaches reported by intrusion detectors,
failures of security systems or power outages. For these factors, it is necessary to determine
the observed time action of the factor. During the period of action, the factor is identified
as an incident and contributes to the reduction of the object’s resilience. After the time has
elapsed, the factor is archived and the resilience of the object increases again.
Various threat lists and descriptions of protection systems are a suitable source for
processing the list of penalty factors. Project documentation of alarm systems, computer
networks and systems for their protection, etc. may be used to create such lists. The results
of security assessments and security audits may also be used. In addition to knowledge
and practical experience, the following materials in particular can be used as basic starting
points for the creation of general catalogues:
• structures and requirements for intruder and hold up alarm and emergency systems,
e.g., according to a number of technical standards EN 50,131 [46];
• structures and requirements for video surveillance systems, e.g., according to a number
of technical standards IEC 62,676 [47];
• structures and requirements for electronic access control systems, e.g., according to a
number of technical standards IEC 60,839 [48];
• structures and requirements for emergency call systems, e.g., according to a number
of technical standards EN 50,134 [49];
• structures and requirements for alarm transmission systems and equipment, e.g.,
according to a number of technical standards EN 50,136 [50];
• requirements for mechanical barrier systems and storage facilities, e.g., according to
technical standards EN 1627 [51], EN 1143 [52], EN 14,450 [53];
• results of security audits;
• common requirements for alarm systems, e.g., according to a number of technical
standards EN 50,130 [54];
• standard equipment of buildings with technical equipment of buildings–heating, air
conditioning, ventilation, electricity, water, etc.;
• facility management documentation;
• standard operating procedures;
• threat catalogues;
• security standards;
• organization of physical security;
• legal security requirements (fire safety, cyber security, chemical accidents, protection
of classified information, construction requirements, etc.);
• requirements of insurance companies and others.
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The calculation of the static penalty factor value is realized according to Equation (7):
Ps = Bs·ks (7)
where Ps = static penalty factor in a given security type; Bsa = active static penalty factor
value; k = significance coefficient. The calculation of dynamic penalty factors is real-
ized analogously.
Penalty of static penalty factor Ps ranges in the interval 〈1; 100〉, where the static
penalty factor maximum penalty point value Bs is in the interval 〈1; 20〉 and the significance
coefficient is evaluated in the interval 〈1; 5〉. A wider range of multicriteria methods
can be used to determine the relevant point values of the penalty and the significance
coefficient [55]:
• Checklist in combination with the point method,
• Multicriteria evaluation of the size of the penalty,
• Method based on expert estimation,
• Fuller’s method,
• Modified Saaty method,
• Pairwise comparison extended by ELO rating,
• Metfessel allocation.
5.4. Procedure for Reference Object Resilience Assessment
Based on the above relationships, it is possible to proceed to the definition of the
procedure for reference object resilience assessment R in electricity critical infrastructure
(see Figure 4).
Figure 4. Procedure for Reference Object Resilience Assessment in Electricity Critical Infrastructure.
The first step in the resilience assessment procedure is the selection of the reference
object and its specification (step 1). This specification focuses on the technical parameters
of the element, which are mainly the element target function, process and functional
architecture, typological structure and technological architecture.
The next step is to identify the reference object assets (step 2). In terms of the overall
clarity of the results, it is appropriate to select only the minimum set of the most impor-
tant assets that fundamentally affect the reference object security behaviour, because the
reference object resilience will always be performed separately for each asset.
Following the identification of assets, it is necessary to define a risk scenario for the
reference object (step 3). These include defining a specific threat, analysing and assessing
risks and modelling the expected threat impact on an element.
The specification of static assets penalty factors and the calculation of the static penalty
index (step 4) and the specification of dynamic assets penalty factors and the calculation of
the dynamic penalty index (step 5) are implemented in a similar way. The calculation of
penalty factor values is performed according to Equation (7). The calculation of static asset
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penalty indices is performed according to Equation (5) and the calculation of dynamic asset
penalty indices is performed according to Equation (6).
The next step is the calculation of asset resilience indices for individual security types
(step 6). This calculation is performed separately for each asset in the area of physical,
cyber and operational security, according to Equation (4). Subsequently, the converged
asset resilience index is calculated for each asset (step 7), according to Equation (3).
The first part of the last step (step 8) is the calculation of the reference object resilience,
which is performed by the weighted arithmetic average of the individual assets converged
resilience according to Equation (2). In the case of reference object resilience index calcula-
tion according to Equation (1), the calculation is performed using asset resilience indices
for individual security types. In this case, step 7 can be omitted. The second part of this
step is to set an acceptable level of resilience. The determination of this threshold may be
based, for example, on approaches to assessing the reliability (or functionality) of physical
protection systems [28,56].
6. Case Study of Practical Application of CRA Method
The last part of the article is intended to demonstrate the practical application of the
CRA method in the form of a case study on a selected electricity critical infrastructure
element. For this purpose, a real transmission system element of the Czech Republic was
selected, which is referred to as a reference object. Due to the need for protection, the
identification data of the selected electricity critical infrastructure element are anonymized.
The resilience assessment of this element was carried out in cooperation with the security
liaison officer of the relevant entity (operator) of the critical infrastructure. Three types of
security, physical, cyber and operational, were selected to converged resilience assessment.
6.1. Selection of Reference Object and its Specification
Based on long-term experience in the field of transmission system network protection,
a very high voltage substation 400 kV or 220 kV/110 kV was chosen as the reference object,
which belongs to a selected anonymised electricity transmission system operator (TSO).
A typical substation in a transmission system usually consists of two separate build-
ings. In the TSO building, voltage levels of very high voltage (220 kV) and especially
high voltage (400 kV) are distributed to neighbouring TSO buildings. Subsequently, it
is transformed to a high voltage level (110 kV), which is then distributed to the neigh-
bouring electricity distribution substation (DSO). Both TSO and DSO facilities cooperate
with each other, but they have separate entrances and perimeter protection. The selected
reference object will represent only the very high voltage part of this substation, which is
the TSO property.
6.2. Identification of the Reference Object Assets
From the point of view of the overall clarity of the results, it is appropriate to select
only the minimum set of the most important assets that fundamentally affect the security
behaviour of the assessed reference object, because security risk assessment and reference
object resilience assessment will always be performed separately for each asset. The result-
ing resilience of the entire reference object is obtained by aggregating the resilience indices
relative to the individual assets. The assets listed in Table 2 were identified for the selected
very high voltage substation reference object.
Table 2. Identified assets for the reference object.
Assets Designation Assets Catalogue (Very High Voltage Substation)
A1 Transformer 400/220 kV
A2 Central house with communication and security technologies
A3 Main building with SCADA system, monitoring and local control workplace
A4 Maintenance workers, fitters in the substation and on very high voltage and high voltage inlets
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For easier clarity, the author’s team set a limitation where the reference object will be
expressed only by asset A1. The calculation of the converged security index of assets A2,
A3 and A4 would proceed analogously and Equation (1) would be used in the conclusion.
In this context, it is necessary to state that the principle and rule of N-1 is widely applied
in the Czech Republic [57]. However, in the case of the transmission system of the Czech
Republic, it is primarily a line infrastructure, not a point infrastructure, as is the case
with the selected critical infrastructure element. We therefore admit that in the context of
redundancy, the availability of a replacement transformer can be assumed, but within the
Czech Republic these are primarily transformers of 220 kV and lower.
6.3. Defining a risk Scenario for a Reference Object
In the context of the following scenario, the effect of risks is perceived as the application
of a dynamic penalty in the individual stages of the scenario. Due to the application aspect
of the presented methodology, four types of signals were defined, which will occur in a
certain sequence and will subsequently be minimized by the measures taken:
- Signal STF1–Alarm state Intruder and hold up alarm system–Violation of the interior
of the building;
- Signal STF10–EFS–Fire alarm;
- Signal STP19–Power failure III–Partial power failure in the building;
- Signal SPK12–Key infrastructure power failure–shutdown.
The set of these signals and their meaning can be modified or supplemented at any
time as needed during the testing of a functional sample for a reference object. Each STx and
SPx signal has two variants, namely “on” and “off”. By a suitable choice of combinations of
signals STx (on, off) and SPx (on, off), the characteristic courses of changes in the reference
object resilience, which could occur in practice, will be simulated for the purposes of the
functional sample.
As an illustrative example, a scenario was defined including the following stages
of incidents: Default state–STF1 (on)–delay–SPK10 (on)–delay–STP19 (on)–delay–SPK12
(on)–security situation resolution–delay–SPK10 (off)–delay STP19 (off)–delay–STF1 (off)–
delay–SPK12 (off)–default state.
The individual stages of the scenario characterize the reference building surrounding
disturbance incident, when the key information infrastructure is switched off with an
unauthorized triggering of a fire alarm and a purposeful partial power failure in the
building. After these events, security and technicians come to the building to investigate
the incident and gradually minimalize its consequences, bringing the resilience of the
reference building to its original initial state. The calculation of individual asset resilience
indices presented in the following chapters.
6.4. Specification of Static Penalty Factors and Calculation of the Asset Static Penalty Index
The next step in reference object resilience assessment is the specification of static
penalty factors and the calculation of the asset static penalty index. Table 3 specifies the
penalties that can be applied to asset A1 (transformer) in the reference object. If “no” is
given in the table, then the measures are sufficient and minimize the risks arising from the
characteristics of the factor. In this case, it is not necessary to apply this penalty factor to
the protected asset. If “yes” is listed in the table, the penalty factor is applied. Equation (5)
is then used to calculate the asset static penalty index.
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Table 3. Static penalty factors applied to reference object asset A1 and calculation of the asset static penalty.
Characteristic of the Factor
Ps Application of the
Asset A1 Penalty
FactorPS CS OS
Static penalty factors–Asset A1–Physical security
The entrance to the inner protected area can be monitored 80 30 20 No
Regular functional tests performed 80 20 10 No
Implemented regular inspections of electrical equipment 70 20 10 No
The procedure for dealing with emergencies (security incidents, terrorist
threats) is set out 80 10 30 Yes
Evaluation of technical protection system states and response to them is realized 80 20 10 No
The determination of responsibilities, duties and powers is implemented 60 30 40 No
Defining mandatory safety training is implemented. 70 70 70 No
Response to security incidents and failures is defined. 60 60 60 No
Static penalty factors–Asset A1–Operational security
Backup power 30 50 40 No
Communication over the organization’s telephone network 10 5 20 No
Traffic Restriction Information 30 40 30 Yes
Risk management 10 30 30 Yes
Personnel security 10 20 20 Yes
Crisis and emergency preparedness 30 30 30 No
Responsibilities and roles 20 40 35 No
Other trainings 10 20 20 Yes
Static penalty factors–Asset A1–Cyber security
Incident response processes 80 80 70 No
Remote control is implemented 20 70 60 No
Remote administration is implemented 20 70 50 No
∑ Psa 140 120 130
∑ Ps 850 715 655
Isp 0,165 0,168 0,198
Legend: PS–physical security, CS–cyber security, OS–operational security.
6.5. Specification of Dynamic Penalty Factors and Calculation of the Asset Dynamic Penalty Index
Similar to static factors, the specification of dynamic penalty factors and the calculation
of the asset dynamic penalty index are performed in this step. Table 4 specifies the dynamic
penalty factors and the calculation of the dynamic penalty index in the context of the
specified course of the selected dynamic factors scenario activation. At the end of the table,
the value of the selected asset dynamic penalty index for individual scenarios is calculated
using equation (6).
The calculation of the asset dynamic penalty index is performed gradually according
to the scenario defined in Section 6.3. First, the penalty factor “Intruder and hold up
alarm system alarm state–Violation of the internal space of the object” is applied, on the
basis of which the index IdpSPK1(on) was calculated. In the next phase of the scenario, the
value of the penalty factor “Electric fire signalization–Alarm” is added to the first penalty
factor and the index IdpSPK10(on) was calculated. Subsequent activation and then gradual
deactivation of other penalty factors according to the scenario additional indices of asset
dynamic penalty was calculated.
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Table 4. Dynamic penalty factors and calculation of the value of selected asset dynamic penalty with respect to the defined
scenario.
Factor Designation Characteristic of the Factor
Default Penalty Application of the
Asset A1 Penalty
FactorPS CS OS
Dynamic Penalty Factors–Asset A1–Physical Security
Intruder and hold up
alarm system alarm
state
Violation of the interior of the building 90 20 10 Yes
Violation of subject protection 95 20 10 No
Initialization of emergency equipment (buttons, bars, etc.) 100 30 50 No
Other states of
intruder and hold up
alarm system
Intruder and hold up alarm system fault state 70 10 10 No
Intruder and hold up alarm system in a state of sabotage 90 10 10 No
Intruder and hold up alarm system in a disarmed state 10 10 10 No
Access system state
Alarm information (e.g., detection of multiple unsuccessful
attempts to enter the object, card disagreement with the
entered code, etc.)
60 20 10 No
Disorder 80 20 20 No
Sabotage 90 20 20 No
State of Electric fire
signalisation
Alarm 100 100 100 Yes
Disorder 80 70 80 No
Sabotage 90 80 80 No
Off 80 70 80 No
Entry/exit of persons Defective control mechanism 50 10 20 No
Natural disaster Natural disaster around the building 30 30 30 No
Influence of weather Impaired visibility 20 20 20 No
Ordered evacuation of
the building E.g., training 20 20 50 No
Accident Industrial accident around the building 50 10 50 No
Dynamic penalty factors–Asset A1–Operational security
Air conditioning
Loss of communication 5 15 15 No
Disorder 10 30 20 No
Failure 10 30 20 No
Backup power Disorder 20 30 40 No




Loss of communication with the system 10 5 20 No
Disorder 10 5 20 No
Failure 10 5 20 No
Technological network Disorder 10 40 40 No
Failure 10 40 40 No
Control system Disorder 20 40 40 No
Failure 20 40 40 No
Weather information
Low temperature 15 15 20 No
Occurrence of strong wind 20 20 5 No
Traffic Restriction
Information
Short-term planned traffic restrictions 10 10 10 No




Technology high temperature technology 20 30 30 No
Technology critically high temperature 30 40 40 No
Power failure
Territorial/Regional power outage 90 90 90 No
Complete power failure in the building 90 90 90 No
Partial power failure in the building 70 90 90 Yes
Ambient power failure 70 70 70 No
IT service failure Failure of key IT services 20 70 40 No
Device failure
Short-term failure 30 40 40 No
Long-term failure 40 50 50 No
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Table 4. Cont.
Factor Designation Characteristic of the Factor
Default Penalty Application of the
Asset A1 Penalty
FactorPS CS OS




In a LAN network 41 62 47 No
In a WAN network 48 73 55 No
In key infrastructure 56 85 64 No
Technique with GDPR 51 77 58 No
Password attack 4H
DService detected
In a LAN network 55 83 62 No
In a WAN network 43 65 49 No
In key infrastructure 66 100 75 No
Technique with GDPR 66 100 75 No
Power supply
Power failure–UPS 26 40 30 No
Key infrastructure power failure–UPS 46 70 53 No
Power failure–shutdown 36 55 41 No
Key infrastructure power failure–shutdown 56 85 64 Yes
Unknown LAN traffic
Upload–Known protocol 40 60 45 No
Upload–unknown protocol 48 73 55 No
Upload–encrypted communication 61 92 69 No
Unknown WAN traffic
Upload–Known protocol 48 72 54 No
Upload–unknown protocol 55 84 63 No
Upload–encrypted communication 66 100 75 No
Exploitation of
vulnerabilities
Backdoor detection 53 81 61 No
Ransomware detection 51 77 58 No
User/password leak detection 52 79 59 No
Detection of an unknown USB device 44 67 50 No
∑ Pd 2308 3050 2737
IdpSPK1(on) 0,038 0,006 0,003
IdpSPK10(on) 0,082 0,039 0,040
IdpSTP19(on) 0,112 0,069 0,073
IdpSPK12(on) 0,137 0,097 0,096
IdpSPK10(off) 0,094 0,064 0,060
IdpSTP19(off) 0,063 0,034 0,027
IdpSTF1(off) 0,024 0,028 0,023
IdpSPK12(off) 0 0 0
Legend: PS–physical security, CS–cyber security, OS–operational security, LAN–local area network, WLAN–wireless local area network,
GDPR–general data protection regulation, UPS–uninterruptible power supply.
6.6. Asset Resilience Index Calculation for Individual Security Types
Based on the calculation of the static penalty index, which is constant over time, and the
calculation of the dynamic penalty index, which is variable in the context of the determined
scenario of selected dynamic factors activation, the asset resilience index for individual security
types was calculated according to Equation (4). The resulting asset resilience indices for the
individual stages of the dynamic factor activation scenario are presented in Table 5.
Table 5. Calculation of the asset resilience index for individual types of security.
Stages of the Scenario Ip Ic Io
ISPK1(on) 80.3 85.1 86.2
ISPK10(on) 76.7 82.3 83.1
ISTP19(on) 74.1 79.7 80.2
ISPK12(on) 72.1 77.3 78.2
ISPK10(o f f ) 75.7 80.2 81.3
ISTP19(o f f ) 78.2 82.7 84.2
ISTF1(o f f ) 81.5 83.2 84.5
ISPK12(o f f ) 83.5 85.6 86.5
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6.7. Asset Converged Resilience Index Calculation
As already stated, selected asset resilience index calculation I according to equation (3)
it is based on arithmetic aggregation of asset resilience indices for individual security types.
The resilience value of the selected asset changes over time, due to the defined stages of the
scenario of selected dynamic factors activation. The value of the asset converged resilience
index is presented in Table 6.
Table 6. Asset Converged Resilience Calculation for Individual Security Types.





ISPK10(o f f ) 79.1
ISTP19(o f f ) 81.7
ISTF1(o f f ) 83.1
ISPK12(o f f ) 85.2
6.8. Reference Object Resilience Calculation and Setting Acceptable Level of Resilience
Reference object resilience calculation R it is based on the fact that converged security
contains several types of security and the reference object usually includes more assets. In
the previous sections of Articles 6.3 to 6.7, the procedure for asset A1 converged security
index calculation according to Equation (3) was presented. The procedure would be
analogous to the assets A2, A3 and A4 converged security index calculation, and then
Equation (2) would be applied to calculate the reference object converged resilience. In this
context, a restriction has been set for better clarity, where the reference object is expressed
by only one asset A1 and thus the weighting coefficient vA1 for this the asset is equal to 1.
The resulting reference object resilience value is presented in Table 7.
Table 7. Reference Object Resilience Calculation.
Stages of the Scenario R





ISPK10(o f f ) 79.1
ISTP19(o f f ) 81.7
ISTF1(o f f ) 83.1
ISPK12(o f f ) 85.2
Figure 5 presents the progression of the asset A1 resilience within the individual stages
of selected dynamic factors application. Default reference object resilience index value R0
it is based on the value of the initial resilience (i.e., 100%) after deducting the static penalty
factors average value Isp presented in Table 3. This initial level is further reduced in the
context of the individual stages of the dynamic penalty factors application scenario. After
minimalization of the causes formulated in the scenario, the asset converged resilience
value gradually returns to its default value.
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Figure 5. Reference Object Resilience Progression in the Context of Individual Dynamic Penalty Factors Application stages.
At the end of the case study, it is necessary to set an acceptable level of resilience,
which detects the moment when, for example, the physical protection system is no longer
able to withstand the effects of threats. Determining this threshold for the application of the
security personnel reactive function is a very complex and ambiguous process, even with
regard to the spectrum of analysed literature and research activities. In the context of the
case study presented above, the resilience acceptable level was set at 70%. This value was to
some extent inspired by approaches to assessing the reliability (or functionality) of physical
protection systems, where, for example, Garcia [28,56] states that technical reliability in
the figurative sense of the reliable system function standard deviation is approximately
30%. This statement is in a sense substantiated by other professional publications, e.g.,
Oyeyinka et al. [58].
Based on these facts, the author’s team accepted this fact as a starting point for
determining the value of the functionality required value and fulfilling the requirements
of converged security individual aspects, in a figurative sense to the value of resilience
acceptable level. The author’s team is aware that setting the limit of resilience acceptable
level may also have an aspect of subjectivity and expertise, but it leans towards the opinion
arising from the mentioned publications. Based on this, it is possible to declare that the
resilience changing value of the asset A1 within the selected dynamic factors application
individual stages did not exceed the limit of the resilience acceptable level. This fact is to
some extent confirmed by the system return to initial state without a significant impact on
the electricity critical infrastructure element functionality.
7. Conclusions
The aim of the article was to describe the CRA method, which allows the electricity
critical infrastructure elements converged resilience assessment. The essence of this method
lies in expressing the influence of individual events and their dynamics on the overall
element’s resilience. The effect of events, referred to as penalty factors, is expressed in
terms of the penalty value. The more intensive events effect on the resilience reduction, the
higher penalty value. The penalty factors themselves are divided into static and dynamic.
Static factors are unchanged depending on the progression of the situation and to change
them it is necessary to take an active action, such as taking relevant measures. On the
contrary, dynamic factors change according to the progression of the situation or event.
Resilience is first assessed for individual security types, i.e., physical, cyber and operational,
and then they are aggregated into the reference object resilience index resulting value.
Energies 2021, 14, 1624 18 of 20
The benefit of the CRA method is the reflection of the all events influence on the
protection system converged resilience. The method focuses mainly on information and
situation management, which integrates and correlates information from systems and
sensors in order to obtain an overview of the situation and the subsequent effective man-
agement of its solution. The application benefit of the method is the element resilience
predictive assessment, which provides the organization’s management with information
on the elements ability to withstand the threats effects with a multispectral impact on
multiple security types and areas.
The practical application of this method, which was demonstrated in the form of
a transmission system selected element case study, demonstrated the functionality and
applicability of the proposed procedure and the ability to reflect the local specifics of
the electricity infrastructure selected element with its specific and unique security and
protection aspects. In conclusion, it can be stated that the method is currently embodied in
a functional sample, which was piloted on TSO several elements. The further development
of this method is seen mainly in the fulfilment of the network infrastructure typology logic
and the reflection cross-elemental and cross-sectoral links in the context of synergistic and
cascading effects in a broader context. In this context, it is also worth noting that the CRA
method may, after adequate modification of penalty factors, be applicable not only in the
field of electricity, but also for the assessment of element resilience in related subsectors,
such as gas or water infrastructures.
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